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  Since the beginning of the 1980s, a worldwide phenomenon of privatization 
has been taking place, involving an increasing number of countries both developed 
and developing.  Just in the latter, the World Bank (1996) reports that total revenues 
from privatization amounted to $112 billion over the period 1988-94, reaching 
almost $27 billion in 1992 alone.  Furthermore, approximately over the same period 
the majority of privatization transactions in these countries involved sales of 
industrial State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) while infrastructure revenues represented 
a third of total revenues (Sader, 1995).  This is to indicate the high value of a 
typical infrastructure project, whether in power, telecommunications, water and 
sanitation or transport.  In addition to the large number of infrastructure projects 
privatized to date worldwide, an increasing number of greenfield projects are being 
undertaken with a significant participation by the private sector.
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  The 1994 World Development Report, devoted to infrastructure, underlines 
the importance of this sector for economic development.  The report notes that 
although developing countries spend 4% of their annual national output on 
infrastructure, two trends emerge: first, the quality of infrastructure services 
provided is well below par; and second, a significant infrastructure deficiency still 
remains.  
 
  The low quality of infrastructure services is mainly a reflection of the low 
efficiency believed to characterize a large number of SOEs, and the improvement of 
which constitutes one of the main objectives of privatization.
2  A s  t o  t h e  
infrastructure deficiency observed in developing countries, it is mainly due to a 
combination of population growth which necessitates continuous infrastructure 
development and the reduced budgetary resources which most of these countries 
have had to face since the beginning of the 1980s.  
 2
  In response, most governments turned to the private sector not just to take 
over existing infrastructure projects but also to undertake much needed new 
projects.  Therefore, the poor quality of infrastructure services and the financial 
constraints faced by governments have contributed to weakening the argument 
traditionally made in favor of publicly-owned infrastructure, that is, its strategic 
importance to the economy.  
 
  Private sector involvement in infrastructure can take many forms. UNCTAD 
(1995) identifies four of these forms: service contracting, management contracting, 
privatization of development rights (which includes leasing and concessions) and 
private sector initiatives (which includes divestiture, full or partial).  With respect to 
new investment projects in infrastructure, concession and particularly the Build-
Operate-Transfer (BOT) arrangement (and its variants) has become in recent years 
the primary form of private participation in infrastructure.
3   A BOT arrangement 
helps reduce the pressure on government finances and also bring in private sector 
efficiency to a project through its various phases. Despite the large initial costs and 
the long time frame of an infrastructure project, private financiers are increasingly 
interested  in investing in this sector, which indicates that they expect to realize 
competitive rates of return given the potential risks associated with this type of 
investment.  
 
  In this paper, the scope is limited to the concession form of private sector 
involvement in infrastructure in developing countries, and more specifically the 
BOT arrangement (in the broad sense).   Under this type of arrangement a number 
of financing sources are available to the project sponsors.  However, financing a 
new infrastructure project may be a risky undertaking.  The purpose of this paper is 
to analyze financing issues in the context of risk.  The first part presents the 
different forms of financing an infrastructure project.  The second part examines the 
main risks to which project financiers may be exposed, and discusses management 







  Under the BOT approach, an infrastructure project can be either undertaken 
by a special purpose corporation or sponsored by an established company.   
Financing of the project is typically of the nonrecourse or limited recourse type 
whereby the lenders can only be repaid from the revenues or cashflows generated by 
the project or from the sale of the assets if the project fails.  Depending on the 
nature of the project, these revenues can be market driven or contract driven.  In the 
first case the service is provided directly to the end user, like in a toll road project 
for instance.  In the second case the service is provided to a specific customer, like 
when power is delivered to a public utility.  Thus, under nonrecourse or limited 
recourse financing, also called project financing, potential lenders would be exposed 
to the various risks associated with the project.  Furthermore, since an infrastructure 
project typically involves several parties each attempting to minimize its risk 
exposure, raising the funds for the project can be a very complex undertaking.
4 In 
this context, the perception of the various providers of funds of the risks involved 
and the way in which these risks are allocated among the parties, will strongly affect 
the financing structure of the project.  
 
  In a recent evaluation of private participation in infrastructure projects in 
which it had been involved over the last thirty years, IFC (1996) reports that the 
average debt-equity ratio was 58:42 and also that 67% of the project costs were 
financed from foreign sources.
5  Considering the leading role played by IFC in 
providing  loan and equity finance to private sector investments in developing 
countries, the above figures could be taken as a fair approximation of a typical 
financing structure of an infrastructure project.
6  In addition to the risks involved in 
an infrastructure project and how they are allocated among the parties, the financing 
structure also depends on the types of domestic and foreign sources of funds 4
available.  The various sources of financing could be broadly classified into three 
main categories: loans, debt securities and equity.  
 
Loans 
  The sponsors of an infrastructure project can obtain part of the funds 
required to undertake the project in the form of loans from financial institutions, 
mainly commercial banks.  These funds could be raised both on the domestic and 
international markets.  Infrastructure loans have two characteristics that distinguish 
them from other types of loans:  they are significant in value terms, and they can 
only be repaid from the cashflows generated by the project.  Therefore, they require 
that the lending institution be large and also that it have some experience in project 
financing which can be a very complex undertaking.  Most banks in developing 
countries are still small by international standards and do not yet have the necessary 
know-how to engage in this type of financing.  Consequently, international banks 
are still dominant in infrastructure lending.  
 
  Banks are generally restricted by their regulators as to the size of the loans 
they can provide to a single client, sector or country.  They are also constrained by 
the time profile of their deposits.  Therefore, they negotiate very carefully the terms 
of their involvement in a new infrastructure project in order to avoid the possibility 
of default by the borrowing party, which is the primary risk faced by any financial 
intermediary.  To this end, banks engage in project risk management which covers 
the whole period of their exposure, that is, all phases of the project (engineering and 
construction, start-up and operations) if the loan extends into the operations phase.  
 
  Given the size of an average infrastructure loan, it is usually underwritten by 
several large international banks and in which domestic banks may take part.   
Although syndicated loans require considerable time to be packaged, their main 
advantage is that they limit the exposure of each bank.  Furthermore, the 
participation of a domestic bank in the deal and its willingness to take on part of the 
risk gives more confidence to the foreign partners in the viability of the project.  5
The same can be said about participation by multilateral government agencies such 
as IFC, the Inter-American Development Bank or the Asian Development Bank.
7 
 
  Export credit agencies (ECAs) may also take part in the financing package 
provided by banks.  This is usually the case for BOT projects which necessitate 
imports of equipment.  However, opinions may differ as to the importance of the 
role of ECAs in infrastructure financing.  O’Sullivan (1996), quoting two experts 
one from a commercial bank and the other from an ECA, notes that the bank officer 
believes that an ECA involvement is time-consuming and costly, while the ECA 




  An alternative to loans available to sponsors of an infrastructure project are 
debt securities, essentially bonds.  If a large firm with good credit ratings is the 
main sponsor of the project, it will not face major difficulties in issuing these bonds 
whether on the domestic or international markets.  These long-term securities are 
mainly purchased by institutional investors such as pension funds and life insurance 
companies.  For pension funds, the long-term nature of contributions and retirement 
payments make their investment policies long-term, and thus bonds are suitable 
securities for these institutions.  Life insurance companies also have long-term 
investment policies since their revenues extend over a long period.  Furthermore, 
these institutional investors generally face strict regulations and are limited as to the 
types of securities in which they can invest.  Highly rated corporate bonds are 
considered by regulators as acceptable investments for these institutional investors.  
 
  Another type of bonds which may be issued by the sponsors are revenue 
bonds.  Unlike bonds issued by an established company, these bonds are backed by 
the cashflows generated by the project as well as the project company assets.  This 
is a riskier type of investment and thus potential investors will be very demanding 
and will scrutinize all aspects of the project before committing any funds.   6
 
  Commercial paper, a short-term security, may also be issued by the 
sponsors.  However, this type of security can only be issued by large and 
established companies and sold at a discount on international markets.  Commercial 
paper can be a suitable source of funds to meet short-term needs of the project 
company.   
 
  In developing countries, bond markets are still limited to government 
securities.  Therefore, for a private firm to issue bonds, it generally has to access 
international markets.  Even then, IFC reports that greenfield projects face difficulty 
in marketing these bonds when they do not involve a strong sponsor and do not have 
government support.  
 
Equity 
  Unlike bonds which are fixed-income debt securities, equity securities 
represent ownership in the corporation.  Although preferred stock characterized by 
fixed dividend is also an equity security, common stock is the main equity security.  
The common stockholder is the residual claimant on the corporation’s income as 
well as assets, and is not guaranteed any return since the corporation is not required  
to pay any dividend.  Therefore, common stocks are a risky investment.  However, 
the stockholder may be willing to forego dividends if the value of the stock 
increases significantly, and thus he can derive a substantial capital gain.  
 
  In order to raise equity for an infrastructure project, the sponsors may access 
both the domestic and international markets.
8  Stock markets in developing countries 
have grown noticeably in the last few years, especially those known as emerging 
markets.  Therefore, sponsors will encounter less difficulty to market this type of 
security locally than in the case of bonds.  Furthermore, issuance of stocks of 
infrastructure companies on the domestic markets will contribute to the development 
of these markets which in turn will make it easier for these companies to raise funds 
in the future.  7
 
  Equity investment in a new infrastructure project in a developing country, 
although risky, may generate high returns.  Indeed, the higher the performance of 
the project, the higher the return to equity investors.  Thus, unlike bonds where 
income is fixed or loans where the return comes in the form of predetermined 
interest payments, return on equity could be very high.  This potential makes 
various types of investors, both domestic and international, attracted to this type of 
investment.  Among equity investors, and in addition to the individual investors, 
there can be investment banks (which can at the same time be part of the loan 
syndicate), life insurance companies (although very cautious), multilateral 
government agencies (such as IFC) and special investment funds.  However, in any 
BOT project, lenders expect the sponsors to hold equity in their project.  Walker 
and Smith (eds., 1995) cite two reasons why this is the case: one, if the debt service 
takes a considerable part of the cashflow, their loans will be at risk; and two, they 
want the sponsors to have some of their own funds in the project which will  further 
motivate them to ensure a successful operation of this project.  
 
  Another financing source for infrastructure projects is what is known as 
quasi-equity or mezzanine finance.  Benoit (1996) describes this type of investment 
as one that “frequently takes the form of debt, but enjoys many of the qualities of 
equity” (p.9).  An example of this type of equity is the convertible unsecured loan 
stock which is a loan stock that pays fixed interest but gives its holder the right to 
convert it into common stock sometime in the future.  Walker and Smith observe 
that this type of financing is attractive to both investors and project sponsors.  For 
investors, the appeal is in the rate of return which is several percentage points 
higher than the cost of senior debt.  For project sponsors, the advantage of such 
financing is that it allows the share of equity in the capital structure of the project to 




  In finance, risk is defined as the possibility that the actual return on an 
investment will be different from the expected return.  In an infrastructure project, 
the various parties involved face some type of risk at one time or another during the 
life of the project.  Financiers, whether those who provide debt or equity, are the 
main parties exposed to these risks.  As mentioned above, the bulk of infrastructure 
financing in developing countries still originates from foreign sources.  This 
international dimension to an infrastructure project makes it even more complex 
than it already is since foreign lending and investing involves additional risks.  In 
the following, the main risks to which project financiers may be exposed will be 
examined and various ways to manage these risks will be discussed.  There are 
several ways to classify the various risks associated with an infrastructure project.  
For the purpose of the present paper where the focus is on the main risks faced by 
the project financiers, the classification adopted is as follows: currency risk, market 




  The sponsor/developer of an infrastructure project in a developing country 
generally  uses both the local currency and a hard currency.  The local currency is 
used to meet the operating expenses such as raw material available on the domestic 
market and wages and salaries.  However, in order to pay for imported equipment, 
pay dividends to foreign stockholders and repay foreign loans, the sponsor needs 
hard currency.  Since the revenues generated by the project are in local currency, 
the local currency requirement is met.  But a risk may arise regarding the hard 
currency needs of the project sponsor.  Here, the currency risk may take two 
different forms: currency convertibility and currency fluctuations. 
 
  If the local government imposes any restrictions on currency convertibility, 
this will be known to all parties concerned before the project is launched.   
Therefore, this question will need to be negotiated with the local government, and 9
settled before the project can proceed.  The sponsor can obtain a special permit from 
the central bank to convert local currency into certain foreign currencies whenever a 
need arises.  In cases where the government or one of its agencies is the customer 
(for example, in the case of a power station), part of the payments to the sponsors 
can be made directly in foreign currency.  Another alternative that both parties 
could agree on is for the project company to set up an offshore  escrow account 
where project revenues would be deposited and foreign loans paid (Walker and 
Smith). 
 
  With respect to currency fluctuations, an appreciation of the value of the 
local currency against hard currencies can only be beneficial to the sponsor and the 
foreign equity investors.  Since an infrastructure project serves primarily the 
domestic market, an appreciation of the value of the currency would not cause a 
reduction in foreign revenues since there are basically none.  However, the local 
currency value  of the foreign debt service would be reduced, and foreign 
stockholders will receive higher dividends denominated in their home currency. 
 
  But when the value of the local currency depreciates, the opposite happens.  
Foreign debt service becomes more expensive in local currency terms, and foreign 
stockholders will receive lower dividends denominated in their home currency.  In 
the preceding, the terms appreciation and depreciation have been used, which 
assumes a flexible exchange rate regime.  However, the outcome would have been 
similar if the terms revaluation and devaluation had been used, meaning a fixed 
exchange rate regime in the country where the infrastructure project is located.   
Regarding the foreign debt, it is generally denominated in a hard currency; thus, the 
foreign lenders should not be affected by a depreciation of the value of the local 
currency unless the depreciation is so severe that the project cashflows cannot even 
cover the foreign debt service.  But the sponsor and the foreign equity holders 
would be affected no matter what the depreciation percentage is.  In addition to the 
impact of the depreciation on the foreign debt service, there would also be an impact 
on the prices of imported input if the project company uses any. 
 10
  In order to reduce the risk of exchange rate depreciation, the sponsor could 
get some guarantees from the local government to cover part of the project 
company’s foreign commitments if the depreciation exceeded a certain percentage.  
An alternative, as suggested by Haley et al. (1994), is for the government and the 
project company to agree on indexation whereby any exchange rate depreciation 
would be passed on to the tariff or toll.  However, such a solution may not be 
politically feasible.  Foreign exchange risk can also be reduced through the use of 
hedging instruments available on international capital markets.  As discussed by 
Hines (1997), currency forward, future and option contracts are available for a 




  It is essentially that involved in the supply of the project company’s input 
and the demand for its output/service.  In both cases, the project company’s 
revenues are at stake.  With respect to the supply of the company’s input, the risk is 
that the project cannot operate due to a reduction in input supplied or a sudden halt 
in that supply.  This is mainly the case in power plants where fuel is the input in 
question.  Both the lenders and the project sponsor want to ensure a continuous 
supply of fuel, and also do not want to be surprised by any unilateral fuel price 
increases imposed by the supplier.  Thus, in order to avoid any unexpected changes 
in both price and quantity of input, the sponsor will require a guarantee regarding a 
continuous flow of supply whether from the supplier itself or from the local 
government. 
 
  With respect to the demand for the project company’s output/service, the 
risk is that the demand falls short of expectations and therefore revenues will be 
affected.  In the case of a power generating project company, the customer is 
usually a local utility company.  In order to avoid any fall in demand by the utility, 
the sponsor will require that this utility company or the local government guarantee 
purchase of the plant output.  To that end, both parties conclude a Power Purchase 11
Agreement (PPA).
9  In the case of another type of infrastructure project where the 
project company provides a service such as in a toll road project, the risk is similar, 
that is, revenues may fall short of expectations.  The demand risk regarding the 
provision of services concerns the level of demand as well as its elasticity.  The 
latter involves the demand response to a service fee change.  In this type of project, 
what the sponsor is required to do prior to any commitment is a thorough market 
study including reliable forecasts of future demand.  A safe strategy in this case 
would be to base the decision to undertake the project on the most conservative 
demand forecast.  However, if the demand is below expectations and the project 
company’s revenues are in jeopardy, the government may take some measures to 
help raise these revenues.  For example, in the case of a toll road it can prevent 




  This category includes risks associated with both the construction and 
operation phases of the project, but which are technical in nature.  In the 
construction phase, unforeseen technical conditions may result in cost overruns 
(inflation may also lead to the same outcome).  Unforeseen technical conditions as 
well as other factors such as a poorly planned construction process may also result 
in completion delays.  The project sponsor can deal with these two types of risk in a 
number of ways. 
 
  With respect to cost overrun risk, the sponsor can either provide additional 
capital in the form of debt or equity or it can initially agree with the contractor on a 
fixed price contract.  In the first case, the sponsor takes on the risk whereas in the 
second case the contractor is constrained to keep construction costs within budget or 
will have to forego part of the construction profit under the best circumstances.  
With respect to completion delays, as was the case for cost overruns, the project 
company can either set aside contingency funds to face the costs of these delays or it 12
can have the contractor commit to a specific completion date.  In the latter case, the 
contractor would be fully responsible for any completion delays. 
 
  In the operation phase of the project, the sponsor may face various types of 
risk which can affect revenues in different degrees, depending on the severity of the 
situation.  To name a few of these risks, there can be an equipment breakdown, 
unproven technology may have been adopted and unskilled labor may be operating 
sophisticated equipment.  The main characteristic of these types of risk is that they 
cause the project to operate at a lower efficiency level.  Thus, there will be a direct 
impact on the performance level of the project company.  Since the sponsor is 
generally required, under the concession terms, to meet a certain performance level 
or face penalties, he must take measures to reduce these types of risk.  For instance, 
with respect to a possible equipment breakdown or the use of unproven technology, 
the sponsor can ensure that the responsibility lies with the contractor by specifying  
that in the construction contract.  For unskilled labor, the sponsor (also operator of 
the project) can ensure that the employees working on advanced equipment get the 
proper training before operations start. 
 
Political Risk 
  In the present context, political risk is primarily intended to mean any action 
of a political nature which may affect in any way the project operations.  This may 
include a change of political regime or legislature and a change in the regulations 
governing the concession agreement.  A change of political regime or legislation 
may cause a policy shift regarding private participation in infrastructure or in the 
extreme case regarding foreign participation in domestic infrastructure projects.  If 
the new government stands against private ownership of infrastructure projects on 
the grounds that a strategic sector should be publicly owned, the likely measure that 
it will take is to nationalize the project.  In this case, the government should 
compensate the financiers on the basis of the present value of their future income.  
If the government opposes foreign participation in domestic infrastructure projects, 
it should compensate the foreign financiers in a similar fashion.  In the above two 
cases, and in order to avoid any type of dispute or legal complication, the 13
concession agreement could clearly address this possibility by including a buyout 
clause. 
  The riskier possibility is for the local government to expropriate the foreign 
owned project company.  Even though in the present world economic and political 
environment, the likelihood of such an event happening is rather remote, such a 
possibility still exists.  In a discussion of potential risks involved in foreign 
infrastructure investments, Wells and Gleason (1995) state that what Vernon called 
the “obsolescing bargain”  regarding countries’ preference for local ownership of 
infrastructure is still valid.  They argue that since an infrastructure project is not 
characterized by a continuous inflow of technology and capital, and does not 
generate any revenues from exports, therefore it can  be operated without foreign 
involvement.  In any case, the project sponsor has always the option of taking up 
insurance against political risk.  The main providers of this type of risk are 
multilateral government agencies such as the World Bank, or national government 
agencies such as the Overseas Private Investment Corporation. 
 
  Changes in the regulatory framework in which the project company operates 
may have a direct impact on its revenues.  To reduce this type of risk, the sponsor 





  A combination of poor quality of services and budget constraints faced by 
governments has been the major factor behind the recent surge in private 
participation in infrastructure in developing countries.  This participation comes 
mainly in the form of concessions, particularly BOT arrangements, whereby the 
government’s role during the concession period is limited to regulating and 
supervising the activity. 
 14
  The purpose of this paper has been to analyze private infrastructure financing 
under the BOT type of concession, characterized by nonrecourse or limited recourse 
financing whereby the lenders can only be repaid from the revenues generated by 
the project.  This limited recourse characteristic and the complex nature of an 
infrastructure project given its size and the number of parties involved bring to the 
forefront the element of risk.  Therefore, any discussion of private infrastructure 
financing must be conducted in the context of risk. 
 
  A private infrastructure project can be financed through loans, debt securities 
and equity.  Despite a recent growth in developing countries’ financial markets, 
foreign financing, particularly lending, remains the dominant form of financing 
infrastructure projects in these countries. 
 
  With respect to the main types of risk faced by financiers of private 
infrastructure projects in developing countries, the paper has examined the 
currency, market, technical and political risks.  The paper has also discussed ways 
in which these risks can be managed or mitigated.  The discussion of risk was 
conducted from the perspective of the sponsor since his concerns reflect those of the 
other project financiers.  From the analysis of risk it can be concluded that, although 
insurance remains an option, an alternative solution would be for each party 




                                            
1.  Saghir (1997) reports that since 1984 the number of privatized infrastructure 
projects has reached 600 in about 100 countries, while that of greenfield projects 
both completed or underway stands at more than 700.  
2. At the heart of the issue of privatization lies the question: does ownership matter? 
In other words, does the type of ownership (public or private) make a difference 
in terms of firm behavior? Based on evidence provided by European public 
enterprises, Hanke (1987) argues in favor of the non-neutrality of property rights 
arrangements and notes the higher efficiency of private enterprises.  In the 
framework of the principal-agent problem, Vickers and Yarrow (1988) discuss 
the impact of different types of ownership on the managerial incentive structure 
and the performance of firms.  They find that ownership does matter but indicate 
that its specific implications on the performance of a firm also depend on the 
regulatory framework and the market structure within which it operates. 
3.  Under the BOT type of concession, the private sector is responsible for the 
design, financing, construction and management of an infrastructure project for 
the period of the concession, at the end of which the project is turned over to the 
government.  Under a variant of this arrangement, Build-Own (BO), the private 
firm remains the owner of the project indefinitely. 
 
4.  Bond and Carter (1994) identify the following as the parties involved in the 
financing of private infrastructure: sponsors or owners, contractors, government, 
customers, financiers and facilitators (financial analysts, lawyers and engineers). 
 
5.  The report also shows that the share of foreign financing has been steadily 
increasing over the last few years, from 62% in 1992 to 78% in 1996. 
 
6.  This structure will undoubtedly vary depending on the nature of the project, as 
the figures in the appendix table A-4 of the IFC report clearly show. 16
                                                                                                                          
 
7.  For a detailed discussion of co-financing between multilateral institutions and 
international banks, see Bouchet and Ghose (1992). 
 
8.  Foreign securities could be issued on the U.S. market through American 
Depository Receipts (ADRs).  These instruments represent indirect ownership of 
a specified number of shares of a foreign company.  The shares are actually held 
in a bank in the issuing company’s home country, and ADRs are issued by a US 
depository bank.  
 
9. In  a concise description of a typical PPA, Economic and Social Commission for 
Western Asia (1997, p.7) states: “ The Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) 
concluded between the project company and the power utility secures the long-
term income of the project by fixing the tariff rates for the power and energy 
produced.  The power tariff consists of two components: a fixed rate and a 
variable rate.  The fixed rate will be paid for the agreed or achieved  availability 
of power, even if the power has not been requested by the utility.  This fixed rate 
normally will cover  all fixed costs of the project company such as debt service, 
return of an on initial investments and all other fixed operation costs.  The 
variable rate will reflect the payments for fuel supplies and a number of other 
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  In response to both the low quality of services provided in most developing 
countries and the budget constraints faced by governments, the private sector is 
increasingly involved in infrastructure.  In this paper, the scope is limited to the 
concession form of private sector involvement in infrastructure, and more 
specifically the BOT arrangement.  However, financing a new infrastructure project 
may be a risky undertaking.  The purpose of the paper is to analyze financing issues 
in the context of risk.  
 To this end, the paper first discusses the various financing sources available, then 
examines the main risks to which project financiers may be exposed and ways to 
mitigate them. 
 
  
 